Abstract: This article measures the success of the two major coups de'etat 
Introduction
On the morning of August 19, 1991, the people of the Soviet Union (and the world) were startled to hear that Mikhail Gorbachev had been ousted from power in a right-wing military coup d'etat. Hard-line Communists, most of whom Gorbachev had appointed to office, temporarily deposed the rightful Soviet President in three dramatic days which shook the world. This extraordinary event in the history of the Soviet Union not only threatened Gorbachev's efforts to democratize the country, but also placed in jeopardy years of progress in East-West relations which occurred during President Gorbachev's administration.
After a brief review of what a coup d'etat is, this comment will consider the Soviet coup of August 1991 ("the August coup") in detail, beginning with an analysis of the coup's underlying causes, and focusing on how it was conducted and why it failed. After suggesting that the takeover could have succeeded if better executed, this work will examine how the coup helped bring about the actual end of the Soviet Union.
The August coup will also be compared to Russia's Bolshevik coup of 1917. Better known as the "October Revolution," the Bolshevik coup essentially created the Soviet Union after Communist forces ousted the existing short-lived democratic government.
Although the Bolshevik and the August coups have many disparities, it will be seen that they possess several interesting and striking similarities. The most profound connection between the two is that the August coup can be regarded as having effectively restored the democratic form of government which the Bolshevik coup deposed. This comment will then explore the constitutional legality of the August coup leaders' actions in overthrowing President Gorbachev and declaring a state of emergency throughout parts of the Soviet Union. It will be shown that although the substitution of the Soviet Vice President for Gorbachev was technically constitutional, it was nevertheless unlawful and illegitimate since it was fraudulently based.
The Coup d' Etat
A coup d'etat (French: "stroke of state") is defined as a "political move to overthrow existing government by force." 1 A more complete definition is that a coup (or putsch) is the sudden substitution of key incumbent government authorities by an individual or small group, usually without any intended or actual change in the government structure itself. 2 The setup of a successful coup regime is essentially the same as that of the old government, with the exception of the top leader or group of leaders.
3
A coup is distinguished from a revolution in that a revolution is clearly an extraconstitutional means of bringing about a change of state government, whereas a coup d'etat involves an unlawful change of state leadership. 4 Unlike a revolution, a coup generally does not bring about broad social and economic changes; existing social and government institutions are usually left untouched in coups d 'etat . 5 Yet sometimes a coup may develop into much more than the replacement of one set of government authorities by another, and may indeed be the first step of a full revolution. 6 In such cases, the coup acts as the triggering event that brings about eventual revolutionary change in a nation. 191, 198 (1984) . Leaders of coups d'etat are usually part of the ruling regime itself and normally leave old governmental institutions and policies n effect after taking over key government positions. Id. 197. 3 Id. 198 . 4 Id. 5 Id. Unlike revolutions, coups usually do not involve popular participation and are usually carried out without bloodshed. Id. a196. Because of this, "[c]oups d'etat … where power changes hands from one man to another, from one clique to another … have been less feared because the change they bring out is circumscribed to the sphere of government and carries a minimum of unquiet to the people at large …" HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 27 (1963) . Furthermore, [T] he focused, concentrated violence of [a] coup seems preferable to the bloody hazard of revolution or civil war. The blow is directed exclusively against the real sources of governmental power, and, if it succeeds, there is no undue disruption of the state. Even from the humanitarian point of view there seem to be strong arguments in favor of the coup, for casualties are likely to be kept to a minimum, and these casualties -from the viewpoints of the rebels -are not suffered by innocent soldiers or citizens but by those very men whose mismanagement of affairs has made change necessary. D. J. GOODSPEED, THE CONSPIRATORS: A STUDY OF THE COUP D'ETAT 232-33 (1961) . This fairly describes the Soviet coup, as the conspirators moved only against Gorbachev, since they considered him the sole cause of the Soviet Union's problems and the only constitutional obstacle to their goals. 6 Hassan, supra note 2, 196. 7 Id. 197 . A coup and a resulting revolution cannot be distinguished when this happens, since such political events run together and end where no one thought they would. Eugene Kamenka, The Concept of a Political Revolution, in REVOLUTION 134 (Carl J. Friedrich, ed. 1966) . "The definition of revolution is not the beginning, but the end of an inquiry into social upheaval, social change, and the translocation of power. " Id. everyday economic matters. 17 Citizens were even permitted to hire workers and start their own private business enterprises. 18 To further social growth, Gorbachev instituted the policy of glasnost ("openness"), which refers to greater democratization of Soviet society. 19 Until Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union was a totalitarian society in which only the words and thoughts of the Communist Party were sanctioned. 20 After Gorbachev placed into effect the principles of glasnost, individuals were permitted to speak out, even against the Communist Party. 21 Censorship was curtailed and public debate encouraged. 22 Although a firm Communist himself, Gorbachev resolved to loosen the Communist Party's omnipotent control over the Soviet government. To accomplish this, Gorbachev began asking the Supreme Soviet (the country's Parliament) for more power for himself. 23 The Parliament responded by creating a strong five-year presidency for Gorbachev in March 1990. 24 By the end of 1990, Gorbachev had received the authority to nullify a Soviet republic's legislation by presidential decree. 25 
Gorbachev's Loss of Authority
The powers which Gorbachev secured made him a virtual dictator. He issued presidential decrees whenever he felt that the integrity of his office was threatened. 26 For example, when demonstrators heckled him at the 1991 May Day Parade in Red Square, he immediately issued a decree making it a criminal offense to insult the President of the Soviet Union. 27 This order largely went unheeded; however, despite his increased power, Gorbachev's authority -the general population's acceptance of his right to rule -actually declined strikingly during 1990 and 1991 as the Soviet people saw that his economic reforms had failed and the country was headed towards economic ruin. 28 Issuing presidential decrees at a rapid rate could not help matters when nobody obeyed them. 29 17 Bazyler, supra note 10, 128. 18 Id. 149. 19 Id. 147. 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 Id. 148. For a report on how censorship lessened after Gorbachev 24 Id. See Article 127 of the final Soviet Constitution for the provisions creating the Soviet presidency. 25 Gorbachev's power to rule by decree was listed as one of the President's powers in the Soviet Constitution: "Om the basis of and in fulfillment of the USSR Constitution and USSR laws, the USSR President issues decrees that have binding force throughout the country." Art. 127, par. 5 KONST. SSSR. Some members of the Supreme Soviet worried about the concentration of so much power in one man, especially considering that Gorbachev constitutionally had more authority than any Soviet leader since Stalin. Bering-Jensen, supra note 23, 16. Other members of the Parliament regarded Gorbachev's strengthening of power as political opportunism and an attempt to create a new powerbase to replace that of the weakening Communist Party. Id. They felt that if Gorbachev wanted a popular mandate for more power, then he should call for a presidential election. Id. His supporters responded that this was impossible since an election might provoke a civil war. Id. There was a more practical reason not to call for a general election: considering the mood of the country, Gorbachev simply would not have won re-election. Id. 26 Henrik Bering-Jensen, In the Midst of the Storm Rides a New World Order, INSIGHT, Dec. 24, 1990-Jan. 7, 1991, 9. 27 Id. 28 Id. The economic troubles of the Soviet Union before the coup are discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 37 through 41. 29 
Id.
A telling example of Gorbachev's general lack of authority before the August coup was his relationship with Boris Yeltsin, the first popularly-elected President of Russia. 30 Gorbachev had made Yeltsin Communist Party leader of Moscow soon after 'coming into power, but dismissed him in 1987 and removed him from the Politburo. 31 Their principle disagreement was that Yelsin advocated moving the Soviet Union to a free market economy as quickly as possible, while Gorbachev desired a much slower pace.
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By late 1990, Gorbachev had evidently taken steps to reverse the forces of glasnost and perestroika, perhaps as one last effort to preserve his political future and keep the Soviet Union together. 33 Government censorship was partially reinstated in early 1991. 34 The K.G.B. became more powerful, with its hard-line Communist chairman, Vladimir A. Kryuchkov, stressing law and order as the solution to the nation's problems. 35 To help make things easier for himself in dealing with right-wing government forces, Gorbachev . See infra note 60 for discussion on Gorbachev's inability to appoint to power friends who were truly loyal to him. See infra note 189 and accompanying text for further discussion on the Soviet vice presidence (and its establishment).
Conditions Before the Coup
In spite of Gorbachev's initiatives, conditions in the Soviet Union became worse during his last years in office. 37 With shortages of even the simplest necessities, the public soon regarded Gorbachev's economic reforms under perestroika as failures. 38 Food rationing was introduced in Moscow and Leningrad for the first time since World War II, and buyers had to wait in line for hours if food was available. 39 As people became more tired of waiting for the promises of perestroika, they became less tolerant of Gorbachev. 40 Soviets saw Mikhail Gorbachev as the cause of their hardship. 41 Citizens, particularly hard-line Communists, had also become acutely aware that their empire was being lost. 42 Gorbachev pulled the Soviet Army out of Afghanistan in 1988 after the Soviet Union had spent eight fruitless years at war. 43 Communist regimes fell like dominos in Eastern Europe. 44 The Warsaw Pact disbanded and the Berlin Wall came down. Buoyed by the collapse of European Communist governments, Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. 45 Nationalism and ethnic strife rose throughout the Soviet republics.
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Older members of Soviet society soon realized that everything they had suffered and struggled for, everything Lenin promised under the "enlightened future of socialism," was nothing more than a sad illusion. 41 Bering-Jensen, supra note 23, 10. Also blamed were: (1) old-time Communists, stubbornly resisting change; (2) Soviet Jews, up to their conspiratorial efforts; (3) the Baltic states (Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania), upsetting the country with their demands for independence; (4) the Muslims, creating trouble in the Soviet South; (5) Westerners, meddling in the affairs of the Soviet Union; and of course (6) bureaucrats, for being bureaucrats. Id. 42 Id. 43 Id. 11. The Afghan war drained the country's treasury and killed thousands of conscripts. Id. Waged in the name of socialism, the war's underlying purpose was to stabilize the Muslim situation within the Soviet Union itself by halting the creation of a new Muslim fundamentalist nation at the Union's southern border. Id. Already demoralized with its defeat in Afghanistan, the Soviet Army returned home to an even bleaker environment. Id. The Afghan defeat also added to the discontent and sorry mood of the Soviet people, especially the leaders of the August coup. The huge military-industrial complex came to loath Gorbachev and his liberal economic and social reforms. 48 The military leadership was considerably upset with the Communist Party's loss of power under Gorbachev, as well as the Soviet Union's declining international strength. 49 The possibility of civil war was a topic of conversation for months throughout 1990 and 1991; persistent rumors of a military coup buzzed around Moscow. 50 The situation became such that it was not clear whether political authority was coming from Gorbachev, the Communist party, the Supreme Soviet, or the Soviet republics.
51
While the Soviet empire fell apart, Gorbachev became increasingly isolated from the public and the events transpiring. There were public demonstrations against Gorbachev. 52 By mid-1991, conditions in the Soviet Union had become ripe for a drastic event to occur.
53 And Gorbachev was just about everybody's target of choice. 56 Gorbachev told the men: So tomorrow you will declare a state of emergency. When then? Can you plan for at least one day ahead, four steps further -what next? The country will reject these measures…. The people are not a battalion of soldiers to whom you can issue the command 'right turn' or 'left turn, march' and they will all do as you tell them. It won't be like that. Just mark my words. GORBACHEV, supra note 55, 21-23. 57 Id. 27. Along with Gorbachev and his wife were other members of his family and 32 loyal bodyguards. Although virtually cut off from the world during his three days of house arrest, Gorbachev was able to keep abreast of coup developments by monitoring the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Liberty, and Voice of America broadcasts. Id. 58 The following are excerpts from the Emergency Committee's resolution announcing the ouster of Gorbachev and the imposition of a state of emergency in the Soviet Union:
The Soviet Coup
In view of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's inability, for health reasons, to perform the duties of the U.S.S.R. President [,] and of the transfer of the U.S.S.R. President's powers, in keeping with Paragraph 7, Article 127 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution, to U.S.S.R. Vice President Gennadi Ivanovich Yanayev, With the aim of overcoming the profound and comprehensive crisis, political, ethnic and civil strife, chaos and anarchy that threaten the lives and security of the Soviet Union's citizens and the sovereignty, territory integrity, freedom and independence of our fatherland, WE RESOLVE: 1. In accordance with Paragraph 3, Article 127, of the U.S.S.R. Constitution and Article 2 of the U.S.S.R. law "on the legal regime of a state of emergency" and with demands by broad popular masses to adopt the most decisive measures to prevent society from sliding into national catastrophe and insure law and order, to declare a state of emergency in some parts of the Soviet Union for six months from 04:00 Moscow time on Aug. 19, 1991. 2. To establish that the constitution and laws of the U.S.S.R. have unconditional priority throughout the territory of the U.S.S.R. In assessing Gorbachev's decisions regarding his appointees, consider the following: The head of state must delegate authority to make and enforce decisions to assistants whom he cannt observe directly and continuously. The larger the size of his administration[,] the more indirect his knowledge of its members becomes. To the extent that he can, he will surround himself with those who seem reliable, but [that] action has unwished for consequences. It makes him vulnerable to the intrigues of his assistants, for they cannot be effective in their public responsibilities unless they have the right to access him, to move freely in critical areas, to meet with colleagues to discuss common or overlapping jurisdiction, and to have subordinates trained to follow orders without question. All of these rights give conspirators invaluable advantages in executing coups d'etat. And needless to say, the same reasons which make [the] administrative head a possible victim of a few of his officials apply with much stronger force to his own ability to conspire to deprive them of their constitutional powers. Leaders of regimes where coups d'etat are more common usually know that they are likely to be deposed by violent means, just as Gorbachev had premonitions that he would be ousted (see below). Id. 71. However, most leaders do not know who the usurpers will be or when they will strike, and do not know what will happen to their lives, families and fortunes. Id. 72. A prudent leader will realize that those most likely to threaten him are posing as loyal supporters occupying positions of trust and protected by the regime itself. Id. This is very applicable to Gorbachev. In states where coups often happen, there can be little mutual confidence among officials. Id. How can a leader contend with problems facing his country when he does not know who his true supporters are, and when he knows that those commanding the government's bases of power are able to either initiate or join in an attempt to oust him? Id. Obviously, leaders in such a position are not very effective, and this can be said of Gorbachev and the situation in which he found himself by August 1991.
Although it is true that Mikhail Gorbachev did nothing to prevent a coup despite being warned that certain individuals were eager to overthrow him, it may be fairer to say that he did not act because he did not have the governmental or political authority to do anything (and did not know what to do anyway). Gorbachev later maintained that his inactivity was actually purposeful: Of course I did foresee the theoretical possibility of a sharp conflict between the forces of renewal and reaction….From the very beginning of the crisis brought about by the radical transformation of our society[,] I tried The specific event sparking the takeover was Gorbachev's endorsement of a new Union treaty with nine of the fifteen Soviet republics which would have produced a drastically redesigned Soviet Union. 61 The pact, which was to have been signed on August 20, would have certified the republics as autonomous states, with pre-eminence in economic policy, and possessing the authority to suspend laws of the central Soviet government. 62 The treaty also amounted to virtual acceptance of the independence claims of the six republics which had indicated they would not sign. 63 By limiting the Kremlin's power over the Soviet republics and Soviet society overall, the new Union treaty clearly posed an imminent threat to the interests and power of the institutions represented by members of the Emergency Committee: the military, the K.G.B., and the underlying Communist Party.
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The group most likely to initiate any form of government overthrow, especially a coup d'etat, is the military leadership, since it has control over the country's armed forces. 65 Elements of the military leadership are usually involved in orchestrating a coup even if the coup leaders are civilians.
66 This is the case with the August coup. Although the Committee of Eight was comprised primarily of Soviet civilian government directors, it does appear that Dmitri Yazov, Vladimir Kryuchkov, and Boris Pogo were the coup's true masterminds. 67 These three men controlled the Soviet empire's vast military forces, powerful K.G.B. units, and dreaded Interior Ministry police.
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As an excuse for its actions, the Emergency Committee maintained that Gorbachev was ill and unable to carry out his duties.
69 "He is very tired after these many years," contended not to allow an explosive resolution of the contradictions to take place. I wanted to gain time by making tactical moves, so as to allow the democratic process to acquire sufficient stability to ease out the old ways and to strengthen people's attachment to the new values. In short, I wanted to bring the country to a stage where any such attempt to seize power would be doomed to failure. GORBACHEV, supra note 55, 13. Gennadi Yanayev, "and will need some time to get better… and it is our hope … that Mikhail Gorbachev, as soon as he feels better, will take up again his office." 70 Gorbachev's whereabouts were initially unknown, although Yanayev stated that Gorbachev was undergoing "treatment" in the south of the country. an you imagine the stress that he has had to endure over the past six years[?] I hope my friend, President Gorbachev, will return to his office and we will work together [again] ." Id. At this press conference, television cameras repeatedly focused in on Yanayev's trembling hands and overall nervous demeanor. 71 Id. Soon after the coup began, various political commentators and experts on the Soviet Union gave their opinions on the putsch and its chances of success. See Voices of I.S. Scholars: These Forces Go Way Back in Russian History, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1991, A12. Princeton University Professor Stephen F. Cohen pointed out that while the takeover was a shock, it was not a surprise: "These people and the institutions that they represent -the militaryindustrial complex, the K.G.B., the [Communist P]arty apparatus, the Ministry of the Interior and the state collective farm structure -were the primary targets of Gorbachev's reforms." Id. University of California at Berkeley Professor Gail Lapidus noted that the Emergency Committee was clear in what it was against: "It is opposed to reform, democratization, the opening to the West and the significant devolution of power to the republics and the secession of some. It does not have a cohesive program of its own." Id. Professor Roald Z. Sagdeyev of the University of Maryland noted that the coup leaders were not using the old Communist jargon of the past. Instead, "they [were] trying to paint themselves as apolitical, on the side of order and legality and against chaos and civil war." Id. Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Carter stated: "In the long run, the coup will most certainly fail. There is no way of putting the old system back together with a military putsch… The putschists represent a bankrupt past, in may respects a criminal past." Id. Condoleezza Rice, former chief Soviet specialist at Individuals or groups instigating coups d'etat also usually claim that the deposed political system had enough problems to warrant a swift change of leadership and that their drastic actions will cure the nation's ills. 72 Yanayev, for example, declared that the Emergency Committee was "guided by the principle that sometimes there are critical situations that call for immediate actions." 73 The Committee of Eight thus believed that the takeover was necessary considering the economic and political crisis facing the Soviet Union. A formal statement from the Emergency Committee to the Soviet people stressed that Gorbachev's reforms had entered "a blind alley," with "[l]ack of faith, apathy and despair" as having "replaced the original enthusiasm and hopes." 74 Furthermore, all democratic institutions created by the popular will are losing weight and effectiveness right in front of our eyes. This is a result of purposeful actions by those who, grossly violating the fundamental law of the U.S.S.R., are effectively in the process of staging an anti-constitutional coup and striving for unbridled personal dictatorial powers. 75 The Emergency Committee seemed to have implied that one of the reasons for the seizure of power was that the office of the presidency had become too powerful, especially in light of the additional powers the Supreme Soviet had granted Gorbachev during the previous year and a half. However, while Gorbachev indeed had almost dictatorial powers on paper before the August putsch, he actually had little tangible authority by that time. The notion that Gorbachev had almost become dictator of the Soviet Union can surely be regarded as merely a shallow and convenient pretext for the Emergency Committee.
Action and Reaction
The coup conspirators moved quickly to reimpose hard-line control in the areas with the greatest insurgent opposition to Communist authority: Moscow, Leningrad and the Baltics the National Security Council, clarified the situation when she pointed out that the August coup was not a true military coup: "There's a lot of calling this a military coup. The military's involved but this is a right-wing putsch. This is all right-wing. That makes it more dangerous." Id. We intend to restore law and order straight away, end bloodshed, declare a war without mercy to end the criminal world, [and] eradicate shameful phenomena discrediting our society and degrading Soviet citizens…. Our prime concern is the solution of the food and housing problems. All available forces will be mobilized to meet these, the most essential needs of the people. We are callingupon workers, peasants, working intelligentsia, all Soviet people to restore…labor discipline and order, [and] republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). 76 Military officers appeared at city halls and other bases of legitimate authority in these regions and announced that they were in charge on behalf of the Emergency Committee. 77 There were swift crackdowns in the Baltics, with Soviet troops surrounding and taking over television stations in Latvia and Lithuania. 78 After flooding Moscow with troops and tanks, the coup leaders immediately banned protest meetings and suspended publication of many newspapers and journals which had enjoyed relative freedom of the press under glasnost. 79 The Committee of Eight also moved against independent broadcast outlets, such as Radio Russia, by having soldiers block entry to the broadcast studios.
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Public attention quickly turned to the one dominating figure left on the political stage: Boris Yeltsin, the only nationally and internationally known leader in Moscow possessing legitimate government authority. 81 When the putsch started, Yeltsin publicly condemned it as "unconstitutional and unlawful" and immediately issued an order countermanding the Emergency Committee's decrees. 82 Seeking to rally resistance, Yeltsin climbed atop an armored vehicle before 20,000 cheering Moscovites in front of the Russian Parliament and called for a general strike to protest to takeover.
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Yeltsin warned the public not to antagonize the Army troops, and promised legal protection for soldiers who defied the coup leaders. 84 The Troops themselves were confused by 76 Clines, supra note 59. 77 Id. [W]e proclaim all decisions and instructions of this committee to be unlawful…. We appeal to citizens of Russia to give a fitting rebuff to the putschists and demand a return of the country to normal constitutional development…. We are absolutely confident that our countrymen will not permit the sanctioning of the tyranny and lawlessness of the putschists, who have lost all shame and conscience. We address an appeal to servicement to manifest lofty civic duty and not take part in the reactionary coup. Until these demands are met, we appeal for a universal unlimited strike. 87 For a time, the scene was set for a confrontation at the Russian Parliament between army troops under the Emergency Committee's command and those loyal to Yeltsin. 88 Furniture, old cars, buses, and other obstacles were piled in the streets of Moscow to hamper tank movements and to serve as barricades in front of Yeltsin's headquarters. 89 On the second night of the coup, Soviet Army command ordered tanks to roam the streets to intimidate the populace and enforce an 11PM military curfew. 90 In the coup's first instance of actual violence, three Moscovites were killed by an armored troop vehicle during the night's chaos. 91 The Emergency Committee soon found that an increasingly resentful public was ignoring its executive decrees and orders, not to mention the military curfew.
92 Despite intense dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs, nearly every Soviet citizen opposed the coup as an illegitimate usurpation by volatile elements of the Communist system. "We are seeing the agony of the old regime," said Oleg D. Kalugin, a former K.G.B. officer who had become the Soviet agency's biggest critic.
93 "These are old guys, simply crazy." 94 The putsch was obviously missing the key legitimizing ingredient of a successful coup d'etat: public support. Leaders of other Soviet Republics began to denounce the coup as an unlawful seizure of power. 95 Latvia and Estonia declared their total independence from the Soviet Union, joining Lithuania. World opposition to the takeover was almost universal.
96 U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, for example, released a statement warning the Emergency Committee: "The whole world is turned against the people. You can erect a throne using bayonets but you cannot sit on bayonets for long…. Clouds of terror and dictatorship are gathering over Russia but this night will not be eternal and our long-suffering people will find its freedom once again, for good. Soldiers, I believe at this tragic hour you will take the right decision. The honor of Russian arms will not be covered with the blood of the people. Entreaty To Troops By Yeltsin, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1991, A10. 85 Keller, supra note 84. See infra note 118 for discussion of the Soviet military's role in the coup. 86 Id. One high-ranking tank officer said that he and others went over to defend the Russian Parliament because they considered the orders of the conspirators illegal. Peter Gumbel & Gerald F. Seib, Spotlight Is on Yeltsin As Soviet Coup Effort Runs Into Roadblocks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1991, A1, A8. Asked if he was afraid of reprisals, the officer said "History will judge us." Id. 87 Clines, supra note 59. 88 Id. 89 Celestine Bohlen, Bare-Fisted Russians Plot a Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1991, A9. Members of Yeltsin's Russian government were issued bullet-proof bests, helmets, and gas masks in preparation for a battle with government troops. Id. However, other than a few pistols, the Yeltsin forces were only armed with sticks, stones, and Molotov cocktails. As one man said, "we could not hold off [the Army] more than five minutes. This is mostly symbolic." Id. 90 Clines, supra note 69. 91 Id. 92 Id. 93 Id. In 1990, Major General Kalugin had been stripped of his rank, awards and pension for publicly criticizing the K.G.B. Id. Gorbachev restored these to Kalugin after the coup. 94 Id. 95 
watching. Legitimacy in 1991 flows not from the barrel of a gun but from the will of the people.
History cannot be reversed. Sooner or later your effort will fail." 97 
The Coup Plotters: Incompetence and Responsibility
Before Baker could deliver his message, however, the coup had begun to falter, with military forces withdrawing from Moscow, Leningrad, and the Baltics. Pursued by a task force led by Russian Republic's Vice President, several members of the Emergency Committee (including Vladimir Kryuchkov and Dmitiri Yazov) flew off to meet with Gorbachev and personally beg for forgiveness. 98 They were arrested upon arriving in the Crimea. Gorbachev said he would ensure that the conspirators carried the "full responsibility" for committing a "state crime." 99 In Moscow, Prime Minister Pavlov was under arrest and hospitalized, apparently ill from drinking. 100 Interior Minister Boris Pogo had killed himself with a shot to his head. 101 Gennadi Yanayev remained in his Kremlin office until Gorbachev loyalists came to arrest him. 102 He tried to excuse his acts by claiming that the other putsch members threatened him with imprisonment if he did not cooperate with them. 103 Ordered to remain in his office, Yanayev had drank himself to unconsciousness by the next morning. 104 The coup was over. is no problem, since the resultant new regime will justify its founders. 107 In pursuit of its goals, a revolutionary group can easily justify its actions if the incumbent government is regarded as incompetent, tyrannical or illegitimate. 108 But if the rebelling group fails, all its acts hostile to the rightful government are illegal and the conspirators will be guilty of treason, the gravest crime of most legal systems.
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The Executvie Committee member ssurely comprehended the two possible results of their actions to remove Gorbachev. If the coup had succeeded, they would have made sure that their resulting hard-line government justified their actions. Soviet history books would begin describing Gorbachev as an ineffective leader who deserved to be overthrown for bringing only hardship, shame, and despair to the Soviet Union. But with the coup's collapse, the conspirator's acts were declared unconstitutional, as were the decrees and laws they passed.
What Went Wrong?
At first, the Bush administration was uncertain as to whether the conspirators would fail, despite the ineffective manner in which they organized and conducted their coup.
110 U.S. officials considered the large number of armed forces at the Emergency Committee's disposal and initially felt that the takeover could last for some time.
111 But after learning of the heavy public resistance against the Committee and reports of mass army defections, administration officials concluded that the putsch was "implemented in stages" and "very amateurish."
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The Bush administration was also astounded that the Emergency Committee neglected to cut Soviet communications with the rest of the world, which let the world's media fully record and report upon events happening during the coup. Soviet citizens themselves returned to the pre-glasnost era method of gathering nonofficial news: monitoring the Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and radio Liberty. Throughout the coup, resistance forces gained and disseminated information by relying surprise, and if surprise is thwarted, they become vulnerable to a counterstroke. Id. A coup which misfires exposes the initiators, revealing them to be the antithesis of what they had seemed to be. Id. 67. This is true with the August coup; Gorbachev found that his "friends" were not as trustworthy as he supposed them to be. 107 112 Id. Another official stated: "What is striking is how limited the writ of the coup plotters seems to be." Id. 113 Id. 114 Id. In a successful coup, the capture of communications facilities is a necessity. GOODPSEED, supra note 5, 227. They are needed by the usurpers for their own use and, equally important, they must be denied to the legitimate government. Id. Also, after a coup has begun, radio and television propaganda can gain time for the development of the revolt and can confuse and dishearten government supporters. Id. Although the Emergency Committee managed to close most Moscow radio stations, it failed to silence the station broadcasting the voice of democratic radical Gavriil K. Popov, the city's first popularly-elected mayor. Popov's pleas to Moscovites to support Yeltsin resulted in over 200,000 people gathering outside the Russian headquarters the day after the coup began. This surely was not foreseen by the putsch leaders.
heavily upon foreign television and radio sources, as well as local telephones, fax machines, and computer nets. 115 Thus the Emergency Committee could do nothing to prevent ordinary citizens from learning first-hand of the events transpiring throughout the country; everybody immediately knew what was at stake. 116 The age of instant information might prove to be a permanent obstacle for those wishing to usurp governments in the future.
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In spite of the Committee of Eight's inability to prevent world and public access to news and information about the coup, it is probable that the August coup could have succeeded had the Emergency Committee resolutely used the formidable military, K.G The conspirators apparently lacked the necessary ruthlessness for a violent government takeover, in which Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and a few thousand protestors would have been killed instantly.
122 They tried for a soft threatening coup, relying on their belief that the Soviet people would simply revert to their 70-year old habit of cowering before Communist governmental authority.
123 But things were different in the Soviet Union by August 1991, and the Emergency Committee overlooked the authority Boris Yeltsin commanded not with force, but with popularity. Authority and governmental legitimacy derived from popular support were concepts the old Communists did not understand.
The August Coup's Aftermath

The End of Soviet Communism
Communist Party leaders emerged after the takeover to denounce the Emergency Committee, and asked the public to be gentle in applying epithets. 124 However, Party bosses soon realized that they were no longer in a position to request or demand obedience from the Soviet people. Citizens saw that Communism was the principle force behind the coup, and joked about (under the Interior Ministry's command) was to storm the building and capture or kill Yeltsin. But despite threats from the K.G.B., the Group refused to participate. Id. This delay permitted Yeltsin's supporters to assume positions in the Russian headquarters and also allowed thousands of Moscovites to rally around the building. Id. "What is incredible," said Yeltsin, "is that the organizers of the coup did not expect this." Id. The attack was repeatedly postponed until it was cancelled altogether. Id. 121 By the takeover's end, members of the Emergency Committee may have wondered whether they should have deposed Yeltsin rather than Gorbachev. Yet in an astounding slip-up, the Committee of Eight failed to even arrest Yeltsin. Arresting or otherwise eliminating him on the day of the coup would have been easy since Yeltsin was lightly guarded and had flown home by commercial airline from a well-publicized trip to Kazakhstan. Bill Keller, Subplots Within the Plot Intrigue Coup Theorists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1991, A10. 122 Consider the following in assessing the Committee of Eight's handling of the coup: The military conspirators were to a large extent the creatures of their own training and environment. And if this should be held against them, it should also be remembered that this was what had made them conspirators in the first place…. They were officers and gentlemen, and therefore totally unfit to be conspirators. GOODSPEED, supra note 5, 206. Although these words refer to the men who had attempted to assassinate Adolph Hitler in Rastenburg in 1944, the same can be said of the Emergency Committee members and their attempted takeover of the Soviet government. Furthermore, it seems true with the August coup that "the kind of men most attracted to political power are seldom best fitted to wield it. Much more frequently, those who have gained control of the state by violence have proved themselves unable to govern well." Id. The secretary of the Central Committee, Sergei Kalashnikov, told people not to use the world "junta" and asked them to consider the eight members of the Emergency Committee as merely having "made a blunder in the estimation of a difficult situation." Id. He also said that the coup should not be used to strike a blow against the Communist Party's reputation. Id.
Russian citizens began to wonder why the Supreme Soviet waited until the coup's end before condemning the takeover. Id. Soviet lawmakers contended that they had condemned the coup in its first few hours, but only bothered publishing their statement a few days later. Id. Gorbachev himself was not pleased with this explanation. He stated that the conspirators would not have been able to carry out their plans if the Parliament had immediately held an emergency meeting to deal with the crisis. GORBACHEV, supra note 55, 43. "[I]f the Supreme Soviet had met on 19 August the coup could have been halted at the very beginning." Id.
the irony of it all: "We knew that Communism couldn't do anything right."
125 Even hard-line Communists not involved in the takeover were critical of the coup leaders, who were all uncharismatic men closely identified with the archaic Communist Party.
126
The failed coup d'etat legitimized the claim of the country's democratic reformers that they were the rightful heirs to power. In the coup's wake, the Communist Party was humiliatingly routed from all levels of Soviet government. 127 The privileges of Party membership, such as limousines and special housing, were abruptly halted, and symbols of Communism were angrily removed from their haughty positions throughout the cities of the Soviet Union. 128 The Soviet people realized there would never be another opportunity to do away with Communism and its sources of power (the K.G.B., the military, and the Interior Ministry).
129 They wanted to make sure that Communism could never later re-group and reassert its control.
Communist Party members protested against "attempts to hold the entire party responsible for criminal actions of a handful of adventurers."
130 And speaking before the Supreme Soviet on August 23, even Gorbachev responded reservedly to actions taken against the Communist Party. "No one has the right to set the task of banishing socialism from our country," Gorbachev said.
131
Death Blow to Gorbachev and the Soviet Union
Yet Gorbachev himself took a step towards banishing socialism from the Soviet Union when he resigned as General Secretary of the Communist Party a few days later. 132 And with Communism under assault throughout the country and his own leadership in shambles as a result of the putsch, Gorbachev changed his mind about defending the Party and proceeded to ban it from any role in Soviet government. 133 This move ended 74 years of Communist rule in the Soviet Union and effectively left Gorbachev without any powerbase. Gorbachev's actions amounted to the final surrender of the old right-wing order to the new democratic order. Upon hearing that the coup was over, President Bush offered the following reason for its collapse: "[The conspirators] underestimated the power of the people, they underestimated what a taste of democracy and freedom brings." 134 Bush also remarked that Boris Yeltsin's standing in the Soviet Union and the world had increased because of the putsch. 135 Indeed, it seems that the overthrow attempt against Gorbachev was the best thing that could have happened to Yeltsin (and the Russian republic), considering how it accelerated the ultimate demise of the Soviet empire, thus enabling Yeltsin to finally gain the sovereignty for Russia he had actively sought. 136 It was clear that the balance of Soviet power had shifted in Yeltsin's favor and away from either Gorbachev or the hard-line Communists. Although Gorbachev emerged from his house arrest in good physical condition, his political status had become even more ambiguous than it was before the putsch. 137 Citizens began regarding him as a fool for appointing to power the men who had tried to overthrow him, despite warnings from both friends and enemies that he should not have trusted them.
138 Some Soviets even speculated that Gorbachev had secretly helped organize his own removal. 139 Finally, the coup not only inflicted a fatal blow to Soviet Communism, but only a few months later brought down Gorbachev and the entire Soviet empire as well. The sudden beginning and end of the coup created a fresh state of confusion and uncertainty in the Soviet Union, which added to the state crisis the country had been experiencing in the years before. Gorbachev tried to maintain a federation of former Soviet states over which he could preside, but the republics instead decided to create a "Commonwealth of Independent States." 140 In December 1991, eleven of the fifteen former Soviet republics signed the agreement, which effectively terminated the Soviet Union.
141 On Christmas Day, Gorbachev bowed to the inevitable and resigned as President of a country which no longer existed. has shown tremendous courage…. I think he will have a well-earned stature around the world that he might not have had…before all this happened." Id. 136 Id. 137 Keller, supra note 125, A1, A11. 138 Id. "Gorbachev's problem all along was that he trusted the wrong people," said one Moscovite. Id. "He never had any trust in us." Id. Even Gorbachev's longtime friend Anatoly Lukyanov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and Valery Bolding, Gorbachev's own chief of staff, were implicated in the conspiracy. Oleg Kalugin, the K.G.B. general who had become the K.G.B.'s biggest critic, said of the situation: "The saddest thing is that the President didn't listen to us. We told him that me mustn't keep the structures that at any moment could organize a putsch against him." Peter Gumbel & Gerald F. Seib, Gorbachev's Downfall Raises Political Specter For Soviets and West, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1991, A1, A11. See supra note 60 for further discussion on Gorbachev's inability to appoint loyal subordinates and his failure to heed warnings that a coup against him would occur. 139 Keller, supra note 125, A1, A11. In these people's view, Gorbachev hoped the coup would either succeed, in which case he could return as dictator, or fail, in which case he would come out as a heroic leader. Id. President George Bush discounted such notions: "To suggest that…President Gorbachev would plot to put the people of the Soviet Union through this kind of trauma and the rest of the world…makes absolutely no sense at all. 151 Increasing war-weariness, the breakdown of the economy, and un-fulfilled promises of democratic reform overtaxed the patience of the masses.
152 Workers, soldiers, and peasant farmers were united in demanding immediate and fundamental change. And not only was the ineffectual Provisional Government forced to contend with the leftist Bolsheviks attacking it, but right-wing former autocrats were also trying to topple it in order to restore the Russian monarchy.
With the slogan "Peace, Land, and Bread," the Bolsheviks capitalized on the entire situation and managed to win a majority in the Petrograd Soviet and other soviets throughout Russia.
153 Leon Trotsky was later elected chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. Lenin decided that the time was ripe to depose Kerensky and the whole Provisional Government.
154 At a meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee on October 10, 155 Lenin won a majority in favor of preparing an imminent armed takeover of Petrograd. 156 He entrusted Trotsky to take the necessary steps to gain the military's support and to train armed workers ("Red Guards") for an insurrection.
157
The October "Revolution"
On October 24, Aleksandr Kerensky sent loyal soldiers to close a Bolshevik newspaper (Rabochii Put--"Worker's Way"), an act which the Bolsheviks considered the beginning of an expected government move against them. 158 In response, the Bolsheviks called on Red Guards and sympathetic soldiers and sailors to defend the Petrograd Soviet. They met only slight resistance from Provisional Government troops. 159 However, subsequent resistance in Moscow to the Bolshevik takeover resulted in many deaths. Following the tactics Lenin and Trotsky had prepared in advance, the rebel forces seized telegraph, telephone, power and railway stations, as well as important bridges in Petrograd. Once the instruments of power were captured, the already week Provisional Government was truly doomed. 160 151 Id. 218. 152 Id. 153 Id. 227. 154 Id. 228. 155 The dates used in this comment when referring to the October Revolution correspond to the Julian Calendar which Russia was still using in 1917. Thus the "October" Revolution of October 24-26 (Julian Calendar) actually occurred on November 6-8 (Gregorian Calendar). Like the August coup, the Bolshevik coup spanned three days which shook the world. 156 Gross, supra note 144 228. The Bolshevik Central Committee passed this resolution: "Recognizing that an armed uprising is inevitable and the time is ripe, the Central Committee proposes to all organizations of the party to act accordinly and to discuss and decide from this point of view all the practical questions." Id. According to Trotsky, "It was a question of taking full possession of Petrograd in the next 24 hours. That meant to seize those political and technical institutions which were still in the hands of the government." LEON TROTSKY, THE HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 207. 157 Gross, supra note 144 229. Lenin stayed hidden throughout the coup because he was wanted by the Provisional Government for allegedly assisting the German war effort. Id. Trotsky thus followed Lenin's instructions as to how to properly conduct a government overthrow. See infra notes 172 and 173 and accompanying text for discussion on Lenin's instructions regarding successfully executing an armed insurrection. 158 Id. 234. 159 Id. The show of arms was enough; there was only a small loss of life with the Bolshevik coup. Id. Three or four Army cadets defending members of the legitimate Provisional Government at Petrograd's Winter Palace were killed. Id. 235. (Similarly, three resisters were killed inthe 1991 Soviet coup. 160 The crumbling Provisional Government appealed to the Russian citizenry, to no avail: Citizens! Save the fatherland, the republic, and freedom! Maniacs have raised a revolt against the only governmental power chosen by the people -the Provisional Government…. Citizens, you must help the Provisional Government. You must strengthen its authority. You must oppose these maniacs, with whom are joined all enemies of liberty and order
The next day, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the overthrow of Kerensky's Provisional Government and declared that the workers' soviets controlled Russia. 161 Consisting of a majority of Bolsheviks, the Congress of Soviets quickly ratified the new regime and elected Lenin as its chairman. 162 Overnight, Lenin had turned from fugitive (in the eyes of the Provisional Government) to head of the world's largest country.
The Bolshevik coup's success can be attributed to leadership abilities and organizational skills of Lenin and Trotsky, although it may be more accurate to say that the victory resulted from the instability of the Provisional Government. Also, the Bolshevik coup was not a spontaneous movement by the Russian public as was the February Revolution; the masses were mostly apathetic to the Provisional Government's overthrow. 163 Such passivity, however, made the coup easier for the Bolsheviks to successfully undertake. 164 Lenin and Trotsky took advantage of the overall social unrest at the time to take control of the government and to keep this control after resistance had ended.
The Bolsheviks' use of conspiracy, tactics, and sudden violence to overthrow the existing lawful regime made the October Revolution a classic example of a well-executed coup d'etat. The February Revolution was the democratic revolution of Russia. Never before and never after have the Russians been as free as they were between the February and October Revolutions of 1917. It was a painful period. But freedom was born out of slavery. 168 Thus the common definition of a coup d'etat as originating from within the existing government does not apply to the Bolshevik coup. Furthermore, the Bolshevik coup was not specifically aimed only at Aleksandr Kerensky; Bolshevik forces attacked and deposed the entire Provisional Government. In the August coup, the Committee of Eight moved only against Mikhail Gorbachev and left most of the Soviet Union's government intact.
However, there are several remarkable similarities between the Bolshevik and August coups. Both the Bolshevik and August coups culminated revolutionary periods in Russian and Soviet history, periods which ended the existence of both nations. The similarities of the coups probably stem from the alikeness of the Soviet empire's social-economic situation in 1991 to that of the Russian empire in 1917. The August coup happened during a difficult time in Soviet history, just as the Bolshevik coup occurred during a very unstable time in Russian history. As in 1917 Russia, the Soviet Union's economy was in shambles by 1991. 169 The democratic and economic reforms Gorbachev had instituted were not proceeding as planned, just as those of the Provisional Government were not successful. The Soviet central government and the Russian Provisional Government had lost popular support, as did their respective leaders, Gorbachev and Kerensky. 170 Like the Russian citizenry in mid-1917, Soviet citizens were demanding and expecting drastic change, starting with the possible removal of Gorbachev himself. Like the usurping Bolsheviks, the August coup's Emergency Committee took advantage of the general social unrest to seize power.
In both 1917 and 1991, the people of Russia and the Soviet Union even had similar demands from the unstable existing governments: food and land. In 1917, Russia was experiencing a terrible shortage of food which made the masses restless and desirous of change. In 1990, food shortages in Moscow and Leningrad forced the introduction of rationing for the first time since World War II, and the public was angry that such shortages could occur in a country considered a world power. As for land, the Bolsheviks of 1917 advocated the seizure of land from the upper class so as to divide it amongst the masses. By 1991, Gorbachev's economic reforms under perestroika had permitted private ownership of real property and business enterprises to exist for the first time in the Soviet Union. Common citizens saw that they could participate in capitalism to make a profit for themselves. Realizing that the Committee of Eight was a threat to Gorbachev The "Art" of Insurrection Weeks before the Bolshevik coup, Lenin had written a long letter to the Bolshevik Central Committee entitled "Marxism and Insurrection" 172 in which he described the tasks necessary to achieve successful armed revolt. The letter concludes with: In order to treat insurrection in a Marxist way, i.e., as an art, we must … without losing a single moment, organize a headquarters of the insurgent detachments, distribute our forces, move the reliable regiments to the most important points … arrest the General Staff and the government, and move against the officer cadets … We must mobilize the armed workers and call them to fight the last desperate fight, occupy the telegraph and the telephone exchange at once, move our insurrection headquarters to the central telephone exchange and connect it by telephone with all the factories, 171 The analogy between the Bolshevik and August coups does have an interesting and frightening component: Boris Yeltsin must parallel Lenin as the leader of their respective liberal forces! Both Lenin and Yeltsin possessed magnetic personalities which enabled each of them to command great popular support. Neither the 1991 Emergency Committee nor the 1917 Provisional Government understood the political authority such support could mobilize. Also, Yeltsin placed the needs and desires of Russia and its citizens above those of the Soviet Union and the other Soviet republics' citizens, much as Lenin sought (so he said) to help Russia's poor laborers, soldiers, and peasant farmers. Furthermore, Yeltsin was convinced of the rightness of openly (and remorselessly) aiding the final downfall of Gorbachev (and the entire Soviet empire) in late 1991. Like Yeltsin, Lenin was thoroughly convinced of the rightness and necessity of forcefully deposing Aleksandr Kerensky and the Provisional Government. 172 174 It is clear that the Bolsheviks had fully adhered to Lenin's instructions as to how to properly and successfully seize government power.
As members of the Communist Party Central Committee, the August coup conspirators should have been familiar with Lenin's teachings. 175 But the members of the Committee of Eight were apparently bad Marxists-Leninists; they did not treat their revolt as an "art." For example, they failed to move battalions loyal to them to key points (and even had difficulty finding any battalions loyal to them). 176 The telephones in Moscow continued working throughout the coup, allowing resisters to rally against the Committee. Newspapers opposing Gorbachev's ouster continued to be published in secret, and the public was, of course, able to tune into foreign radio stations for non-official news.
The Legality of the August Coup
Rules of Succession
In his article A Legal Theory of Revolutions, Professor Ali Khan of Washburn University developed a theory to determine the legitimacy of revolutions and other forms of political upheaval (including coups d'etat). 177 The theory focuses on the significance of succession rules. 178 Succession rules are the power-conferring procedures through which: (1) legislators acquire the legal right to make laws, and (2) executives (or leaders) acquire the legal right to enforce laws.
There are two types of succession rules. The "successor-in-title" rule prescribes the legal mode of determining a successor.
180 Such a succession rule denotes the manner in which successive leaders and legislators legitimately gain their authority, such as the election process or succession through title or rank. 181 The other kind of succession rule is the "rule of devolvement contingencies." 182 A devolvement contingency is a specific event which must occur before the office and power of a law maker or law enforcer is passed to his successor, such as when an existing office-holder dies and the legal successor-in-title assumes the office.
183
A legitimate succession takes place only when both succession rules are followed. A particular event required by the rule of devolvement contingencies must occur, and the individual succeeding to the office must then meet the nation's successor-in-title requirements. 184 A change of government leadership is illegitimate when a revolutionary group takes possession of state control in violation of either type of succession rule. 185 The overthrow of a leader is unlawful if the principle usurper is not his successor-in-title, even if the requirements of the devolvement contingencies are completely met. 186 Alternatively, if a leader is forced to leave his office in a manner contrary to or not specified in the appropriate rule of devolvement contingencies, the succession is unlawful even if the individual assuming office is the true successor-in-title. 187 
Succession Rules of the Soviet Constitution
This was the case in the August coup. Vice President Gennadi Yanayev was indeed the constitutionally-designated successor to Mikhail Gorbachev. 188 Article 127, Paragraph 10 of the last Soviet Constitution, which ostensively reflected Soviet society's will regarding the country's leadership, read that the Vice President would assume the presidency if the President was incapacitated:
In the President of the USSR is unable to continue performing his duties for one reason or another, pending the election of a new President of the USSR [,] his powers are transferred to the Vice-President of the USSR, or, if this is impossible, to the Chairman of the USSR Supreme even a legitimate rule of the legal system to prove the validity of his coercive order, despite having all the force necessary to demand obedience. Id. 180 Id. 24. 181 Id. For example, the office of the President of the United States devolves only to the Vice President, the constitutionally-designated presidential successor. 182 Id. 183 Id. In the United States, only the death, resignation, or constitutional removal of the President from office serve as valid contingencies required before the Vice President may assume the presidency. Id. 184 Id. 185 Id. 3. If the new regime attains power through the nation's existing succession rules, no revolution occurs in the legal sense, even if the new government intends to revolutionize the country. Id. 4. On the other hand, if a group of individuals seize power in violation of existing succession rules, a revolution in the legal sense does take place, even if the group does not intend to effect any social changes. Id. 5. 186 Id. 25. 187 Id. 24. Of course, a revolution or coup is certainly unlawful when leaders or legislators are deposed in violation of both the legal and contingent rules of succession. Id. Soviet…. In such an event, the election of a new President of the USSR is to be held within three months. 189 This constitutional provision, in effect at the time of the August coup, made Gennadi Yanayev President Gorbachev's lawful successor-in-title. The Emergency Committee members must have felt that having the actual successor-in-title assume the Presidency would lend the coup a somewhat legitimate appearance. 190 However, the rule of devolvement contingencies mentioned in the constitutional provision was not truly satisfied because the Committee of Eight had contrived the excuse that grobachev was ill and thus was "unable to continue performing his duties." 191 In actuality, Gorbachev was healthy and fully able to fulfill his presidential duties. 192 Therefore, despite technically fulfilling the succession rules specified in the Soviet constitution, the substitution of Vice President Yanayev for President Gorbachev was unconstitutional since it was fraudulently effected. 193 
The Legality of the State of Emergency
The Committee of Eight obviously desired a state of emergency imposed in parts of the Soviet Union so as to be able to constitutionally declare rigid Communist control over the militant republics and to freely repeal many of Gorbachev's democratic reforms. 194 Under the final Soviet Constitution, there were only two ways for the President to legally declare a state of emergency: (1) The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or any one of the Soviet republics could request the President to do this, or (2) the President on his own initiative could do so as long as he submitted this decision to the Supreme Soviet for subsequent ratification. 195 The Emergency Committee members knew they could not safely (or successfully) request either the Supreme Soviet or the republics to ask Gorbachev to impose a state of emergency. They were left only with the alternative of having Gorbachev do so under his own constitutional authority. Realizing that Gorbachev would not agree to this, the coup perpetrators tried to force him to resign 'voluntarily." When Gorbachev refused, they decided to depose him, and justified their actions by asserting that Gorbachev's health prevented him from continuing his presidential duties. However false it was, this lie served as a legitimate reason to install Yanayev as President of the Soviet Union, according to the Soviet constitution. Once in power, "President" Yanayev could legally proceed to take action and make changes on behalf of the Committee of Eight, including proclaiming a state of emergency in parts of the nation.
196
Conclusion
The August 1991 Soviet coup stemmed from the desire of the old-guard Communists to declare a state of emergency throughout parts of the Soviet Union. Such a state of emergency would have allowed the Executive Committee to legally reimpose stern Communist control throughout the country. Overthrowing Gorbachev was the only practicable means of accomplishing this objective. However, besides not reflecting the will of the Soviet people, the Committee of Eight's actions were clearly illegitimate and unconstitutional. The entire takeover 194 See supra note 58 for text of the first resolution the Emergency Committee passed upon deposing Gorbachev: the declaration of a state of emergency "in some parts of the Soviet Union for six months from 04:00 Moscow time on Aug. 19, 1991." Boris Yeltsin pointed out the reason why the Committee of Eight selectively imposed the state of emergency only in Moscow, Leningrad, and the Baltic states: "These actions are not aimed against Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, but against democratic Russia. The state of emergency has been imposed only where the leadership is democratic…. This makes clear against whom this putsch was made." Clines, supra note 69. 195 Article 127, Paragraph 3, section 15, of the last Soviet Constitution delineated the Soviet President's authority to declare a state of emergency: The President of the USSR: 15.
[I]n the interests of ensuring the safety of USSR citizens, issues warnings about the declaration of a state of emergency in specific localities, and when necessary introduces a state of emergency at the request or with the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or the supreme body of state power of the relevant Union republic. In the absence of such consent, introduces a state of emergency with immediate submission of the decision for ratification by the USSR Supreme Soviet…. In the instances indicated in the first part of this point, the President may introduce temporary presidential rule, while observing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union republic. The conditions applying under a state of emergency, as well as under presidential rule, are determined by law. Art. 127, par. 3, sec. 15, KONST. SSSR. 196 During the press conference announcing Gorbachev's ousting, Yanayev did declare that the legality of the state of emergency would be settled at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet the following week. Excerpts From the New Leader's Remarks: Law and Order', supra note 69, A12. Later, in an interview from the Matrosskaya Tishina Prison where he and the other plotters were awaiting trial, Valentin Pavlov said that he and the other plotters simply hoped that the Supreme Soviet would approve of the Emergency Committee's actions and that afterwards "things would work out." Kinzer, supra note 67, A7.
